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he opportunities for institutional advancement in the EU created by the dismal 
management of the eurozone crisis may well include the establishment of a 
banking union, a theme that could be placed on the agenda of the forthcoming 
European Council at the end of June. The debate on this topic, however, seems mired 
in confusion, notably as regards the features and tasks of deposit insurance at the 
eurozone or EU level in combating contagion and restoring financial stability. It also 
seems at times to overlook the fact that many constituent elements of banking union 
are  already  present  in  the  legislation  in  force  or  tabled  for  approval  and,  more 
importantly, that much of what is needed may be feasible with ordinary legislative 
procedures.  
There is a need, to start with, to distinguish clearly what is needed to address a 
‘systemic’ confidence crisis hitting the banking system – which is mainly or solely a 
eurozone  problem  –  and  ‘fair  weather’  arrangements  to  prevent  individual  bank 
crises and, when they occur, to manage them in an orderly fashion so as to minimise 
systemic  spillovers  and  the  cost  to  taxpayers,  which  is  of  concern  for  the  entire 
European  Union.  Much  of  the  ongoing  debate  on  deposit  insurance  and  banking 
resolution  funds  mainly  refers  to  the  latter  issue;  deposit  insurance  or  resolution 
arrangements can be instrumental in confidence-building over the medium term but 
couldn’t ever have sufficient resources to meet a spreading run on deposits. More 
important, “using extended insurance coverage to stabilise financial systems in the 
absence of appropriate institutional, political and fiscal conditions to address existing 
problems” would entail moral hazard (IADI, 2012). Financial stabilisation in the short 
term is the proper task of lending of last resort by the central bank.  
Taking up the ‘fair weather’ system first, we have always known that a stable and 
well-functioning  internal  market  in  banking  requires  EU-wide  deposit  insurance, 
crisis resolution procedures and supervision. While the desire to preserve national 
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prerogatives in these domains has slowed down the progress in this direction, the 
crisis is now accelerating progress on all three fronts.  
As to deposit insurance, Directive 94/19/EC, as amended by Directive 2009/14/EC, 
and  a  new  directive  under  consideration  by  Council  and  Parliament,  based  on  a 
Commission proposal of July 2010,1 have already harmonized the level of depositor 
protection (€100,000) and will require all national systems to be funded ex-ante with 
a significant risk-based component of fees paid by participating banks. The European 
Commission has further proposed that each national scheme should target a level of 
funding  of  1.5%  of  total  insured  deposits,  to  be  reached  within  10  years  (which 
Parliament  has  lengthened  to  15).  The  target  level  is  supported  by  the  European 
Parliament, but the member states in the Council would like to lower it to 0.5%. A 
recent  survey  prepared  by  the  Financial  Stability  Board  shows  that  most  EU 
members  are  already  compliant  with  the  principles  of  the  Commission  proposal 
(with ex-post-funded deposit insurance still present in Italy, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom); however, the size of insurance funds is very small, well below 
even the lower target acceptable to the member states (see FSB, 2012, Table 7, p. 52).  
There  is  also  a  provision  whereby  national  guarantee  funds  may,  under  certain 
circumstances, lend funds to each other on a voluntary basis to meet unexpected 
shortages; the Commission wanted this to be a legal obligation but Parliament and 
Council did not accept it. This provision is insufficient to meet the funding needs that 
may arise from substantial losses at a large cross-border bank. An adequate solution 
may only come from an EU-wide deposit insurance scheme covering all cross-border 
banks, as proposed by Carmassi et al. (2010). 
Regarding crisis prevention, management and resolution, the Commission proposal2 
published on June 6th represents significant progress towards an effective framework 
to reduce the risk of a systemic banking crisis and minimise taxpayers’ exposure to 
losses from an insolvent bank. There would be a single administrative (i.e. out-of-
court)  procedure  covering  crisis  prevention,  crisis  management  (with  early 
intervention) and resolution; all countries would have to confer similar resolution 
powers  to  a  competent  authority  to  be  identified  at  national  level,  as  originally 
suggested by BCBS (2010). In order to strengthen the incentives for management and 
shareholders to avoid excessive risk-taking, it is also envisaged that banks may be 
required to issue a sufficient proportion of their capital in the form of convertible 
debentures, which would be converted into equity by discretionary decision of the 
resolution  authority  (discipline  effects  would  have  been  stronger  with  automatic 
conversion triggered by market indicators of capital strength much before arriving at 
the stage of resolution, as in Carmassi & Micossi, 2012).  
The proposal also requires each member state to set up a national resolution fund, 
again normally financed ex-ante with risk-based fees, in extraordinary circumstances 
                                                   
1  Proposal  for  a  Directive  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  Deposit  Guarantee 
Schemes [recast], Brussels, 12.7.2010, COM(2010)368 final. 
2 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for 
the  recovery  and  resolution  of  credit  institutions  and  investment  firms  and  amending  Council 
Directives  77/91/EEC  and  82/891/EC,  Directives  2001/24/EC,  2002/47/EC,  2004/25/EC, 
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also with ex-post contributions. The targeted funding level must reach, within 10 
years, at least 1% of the amount of deposits of all banks authorised in the member 
state  which  are  guaranteed  under  Directive  94/19/EC.  In  principle  these  funds 
should never be used to cover losses of banks undergoing resolution, but only to 
support  the  restructuring  process  and  provide  capital  for  the  new  bank  possibly 
emerging  from  resolution.  More  broadly,  the  Commission  text  leaves  too  much 
discretion  to  national  supervisors  and  resolution  authorities  in  their  decision  to 
undertake  corrective  action.  What  is  needed  is  a  system  of  mandated  corrective 
action at EU level that will force supervisors to intervene and apply measures of 
increasing intensity as bank capital weakens below pre-determined thresholds, in full 
public light (see Carmassi & Micossi, 2012).      
A specific element of supranational solidarity is represented by the obligation for 
each  fund  to  lend  money  to  their  counterparts  in  other  member  states  –  for  an 
amount up to one-half of its resources – in case of need. This proposal, however, has 
been met by strong opposition by the member states, not surprisingly, since it entails 
a ‘mutualisation’ of risks that seems hardly acceptable without a centralisation of 
supervision. An additional difficulty is represented by the wide variation of capital 
requirements  made  possible  by  Basel  capital  rules,  which  Basel  III  and  the  new 
CRR/CRD IV will only aggravate. Moreover, as with deposit insurance, there are no 
specific  provisions  for  the  resolution  at  EU  level  of  cross-border  banks,  with 
attendant resolution powers and resources. 
Lack of centralised supervision and mandated supervisory action are main missing 
elements in the proposals  that  have been tabled so far. Here, a decision must be 
taken, first of all, on the competent authority at EU level: should these powers be 
centralised within the European Central Bank, or rather with the European Banking 
Authority  (EBA)?  Should  the  occasion  be  exploited  to  create  an  integrated 
supervisory  system  covering  all  financial  activities  and  organised  according  to 
horizontal  objectives,  i.e.  macro-stability,  micro-stability  and  transparency  cum 
market integrity (as outlined in Di Noia & Micossi, 2009)?  
Whatever the decision, the good news is that the Council already has the legal power 
to  implement  the  first  solution  (centralisation  of  supervision  at  the  ECB)  under 
Treaty Art. 127.6, while the second solution (EBA) could be realised with ordinary 
legislation by building upon the binding mediation powers already entrusted to EBA 
by  its  founding  Regulation.3  Whatever  route  one  chooses,  centralization  could  be 
limited to cross-border banking groups, while continuing to utilize existing national 
supervisory structures, under appropriate coordination arrangements.  
Crisis management is an entirely different matter that specifically concerns only the 
eurozone.  What  is  special  to  the  eurozone  in  the  present  circumstances  is  a 
confidence  crisis  bred  by  intertwined  sovereign  and  banking  crises  that  are  a 
consequence of faulty design of the currency union: eurozone member states share a 
common  currency  but  cannot  use  it  freely  to  roll  over  their  sovereign  debts  or 
                                                   
3 By modifying Arts 19 and 21 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking 
Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC. 
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provide liquidity to their banking system in case of a liquidity or confidence shock. 
Indeed, while the ECB can intervene to provide unlimited liquidity, it is reluctant to 
do  so  in  the  absence  of  solid  ‘fiscal’  arrangements  for  sharing  the  risk  of  its 
interventions  –  as  Mario  Draghi  once  again  reiterated,  after  the  latest  monthly 
meeting of the ECB Governing Council, while explaining the decision to hold interest 
rates constant despite sharply falling activity in the eurozone.  
The appropriate instrument to build adequate fiscal backing for ECB interventions 
obviously is the European Stability Mechanism: while it is for the ECB to provide 
temporary relief of liquidity strains, only the member states can deploy the resources 
required to recapitalise troubled banks, of course under appropriate conditionality – 
but so far have failed to come up with satisfactory and lasting arrangements, able to 
restore confidence in financial markets. The principles to be followed and the specific 
measures  required  to  stop  the  meltdown  of  the  Greek  banking  system  and  halt 
contagion in Spanish banks are well identified by Gros & Schoenmaker (2012) and 
Véron (2012). What must be stressed, once again, are the disastrous consequences of 
continuing the game of brinkmanship between governments and the central bank, 
which has brought us closer and closer to the dissolution of the eurozone. 
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